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Abstract

In this study I examineJordan'spolitical liberalizationfollowing the late 1980's
economic crisis and its subsequentreversalwith the selectoratetheory comparedto the
transition approachto democratization. I find that looking at thesepolicies in light of
selectioninstitutionsallows me to betterunderstandthe political incentivesshapingthem,
the policies themselves,and their effects. Specifically,the selectoratetheory explains
Jordan'sliberalizationas a heavily regulatedsurvival strategyfurtheringregime interests
and actuallyinhibiting a genuinepolitical opening. This theory su{passes
the transition
approachin its ability to accountfor the ironic strengtheningof the king's position as
liberalizationprogressedas well as why deliberalizationwas inevitable.

INTRODUCTION
During the last decadeof King Hussein'slife, Jordanwitnesseda numberof
historic,controversial,and intriguing policy developments.Spectatorsin the West
cheeredan ostensibly genuinedemocratizationprocess,economic structural reform, and a
momentouspeacetreaty with Israel and troubled over Jordan's seemingsupport for haq
during the Gulf War and the subsequent
halt toward democratization.It seemedas if
Jordanwere caughtin the middle of somemultilateralgameof tug-of-war,underpressure
from numerousinfluencesat oppositionwith eachother.
In this study I addressJordan'sshifts toward and away from political
liberalizationin light of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,Alastair Smith, RandolphSiverson,
and JamesMorrow's (2003) selectoratetheory,comparingthe theory's ability to explain
thesepolicies to that of the transition approachto democratization. Chapterone presents
the liberalization and deliberalization policies in detail, why they have proved puzzling,
and some of the existing explanationsfor them. Chaptertwo then provides an overview
of both the selectoratetheory as well as the transition approach. Chapterthree examines
the arrangementof selectioninstitutions in Jordanbefore and throughout liberalization.
Chapterfour then usesthe abovetheoreticalapproachesto explain Jordan'spolitical
liberalizationand deliberalization.

CHAPTER ONE: POLITICAL LIBERALZATION

IN JORDAN

On November8, 1989,Jordanheld its first parliamentaryelectionsin22 years,
marking the beginningof a much hailed political liberalizationprocessthat would
ultimately be reversedin the mid-1990's. While it is generallyagreedthat liberalization
was initiated in responseto the political unrestsurroundingthe existing economiccrisis,
it is lessclear why the processslowedwhen it did and what was responsiblefor its
reversal.
The 1980'ssaw the end ofa regionalboom surroundingand supportingJordan,
spelling disasterfor the externally dependentkingdom. Rather than adjust expenditure
accordingly,Jordanactuallyincreasedspendingfrom 1983to 1988,bonowing $225
million, $150 million, and $215million in 1983,1984,and 1985for budgetarysupport
with no prospectof timely repayment.The inevitableeconomiccrisis hit hard in 1988
after Jordan's disengagementfrom the West Bank territories. Unemployment mounted,
the Jordaniandinar lost around a third of its value, and the kingdom's external debt
climbed to nearly doubleits GNP (Lucas 200s,26; Robins 2004,166). After some
hesitation and with reluctance,Jordan agreedto a stabilization program with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), requiring steepprice rises to cut the budget deficit.
On April 18, 1989,riots eruptedin responseto the removal of food and fuel
subsidies,austeritymeasuresimplementedto cut the budgetdeficit. Beginningin the
southern,pro-regimecity of Ma'an, the riots soon spreadto other traditionally proHashemitetowns, such as Kerak, Shubak,and Tafilah. To make mattersworse for the
regime,protestswere not limited to economicconditions. Tribal, community,and

businessleadersvoiced grievancesconcerningwidespreadgovernmentcorruptionand
the lack of political freedoms(Shlaim 2007,474; Robins 2004, 170).
King Hussein respondedquickly to the threat, sacking the com.rptand unpopular
Prime Minister Zaid al-Rifa'i and establishinga transitiongovernmentunderhis cousin,
Sharif Zaidbin Shaker,with the chargeof preparing for the first national parliamentary
elections in over 20 years. The king continuedby removing notoriously corrupt officials
and announcinghis plan for a National Charter to plot the way forward toward greater
political liberalization.
Jordan's so-calleddemocratizationattractedgreat attention as it steadily
progressed(for accountsexpressingcommonhopesand fearsfor the nascent
democratizationseeAmawi 1992;Geyelin 1989). A new governmentunderMudar
Badran formed after the electionsfurthered liberalization. Including six Islamists from
the opposition,Badran'sgovernmentreturnedconfiscatedpassports,releasedpolitical
prisoners,and began work on ending martial law and relaxing governmentcontrol of the
press. By this time a Royal Commissionconsistingof sixty membersfrom acrossthe
political spectrumhad begun work on the National Charter announcedby the king.
Ratified in June 1991,the Charteradvancedpolitical pluralism in Jordan,while
confirming the legitimacy of the monarch.
One of the most noticeableinstancesof Jordan'sseemingdemocratizationwas the
small kingdom's stanceduring the Gulf War after SaddamHussein'sAugust Z,lgg1
invasionof Kuwait and subsequentannexationof the small state. Eventuallyresultingin
a UN-mandatedfull-scalewar, haq's behaviorposeda seriouschallengeto King

Hussein'sJordan.
Despite his close friendship with the Iraqi leader,Hussein seemsto have been
completely surprisedby the invasion. As the current chairman of the new Arab
CooperationCouncil (ACC), an alliance including Jordan,Iraq, Egypt, and North yemen,
Husseinfacedpressureto accountfor the actionsof his ally. In addition to these
diplomatic ties with haq, Jordanwas economicallydependenton the aggressivestate.
Iraq provided95Voof Jordan'soil and bought457oof its exports(Shlaim 2007, 488).
Nevertheless,Jordanhad far more to lose by sticking with kaq thanjoining the rest of the
world in condemningit. Both the United Statesand Gulf countriesmadeit clear that aid
to Jordanwould be cut if Husseindid not join in their oppositionto the invasion,the
effects of which promised to be more severethan the loss of Iraq as a trading partner,
especiallyconsideringthe Bush administration'ssuggestionof monetaryrewardsfor
Hussein's compliance(Shlaim 2007).
Despiterepeatedwarningsand overwhelminginternationalpressure,Husseindid
not clearly condemnthe invasionof Kuwait, opting insteadfor ambiguouslanguage
denying territory obtainedby force. Jordan also delayedconsiderablyin implementing
the UN embargo againstkaq. Whether this behavior constitutessupport for Iraq, as
Jordan'scritics maintained,or not, Husseindid make clear his lack of supportfor the
U.S. coalition, accusingit of an "embargoon dialogue"and condemningits war to eject
Iraq from Kuwait. As Philip Robins explains, the "prudent courseof action for the kine
ought then to have been politically to keep his head down," rather than .,making
increasinglyimpassionedcriticisms of the uS-led war effort" (2004,17g-1g0). As

expected,Hussein'stacit supportof Iraq and oppositionto the U.S.-ledcoalition resulted
in devastatingeconomicconsequences
for Jordan. Foreign aid was cut as relationswith
both the West and Gulf countries deteriorated,refugeesflooded the country, and trade
with haq was damageddue to the sanctionsimposedby SecurityCouncil Resolution661.
The overall cost of the crisis to Jordanhasbeenestimatedat $3.6 billion in 1991,when
Jordan'stotal GDP at that time stoodonly at $4.7 billion (Shlaim 2001,507).
Why did Hussein persist in defying the international community, a path that
clearly led to economicand political disaster?It seemsclear that the King's behaviorcan
only be explainedby the generallypro-Iraq domesticopinion within Jordan.
Commentatorsin the West certainlynoticedHussein'srising popularity at home as he
refusedto clearly condemnhis neighbor(Boustany1990;Burns 1990;Milton-Edwards
1'993).That Husseinvalueddomesticopinion over Jordan'seconomicwell-being,
internationalreputation,and relationswith its allies seemeda cogentattestationof a new,
liberal Jordanwherecitizens' opinionscould help shapepolicy. More liberal
developmentswould follow, including the legalizationof political partiesin 1992and the
Pressand Publications Law of 1993,guaranteeinggreaterfreedomsto a presswhich,
until then, had beenlargely owned and controlledby the government(Lucas2005).
By this time, however,the push toward liberalizationhad clearly slowed. Peace
with Israelwas looking more and more likely, and the regimewas willing to suppress
resistance.As early as the fall of 1991,securityforcesbegancrackingdown on the vocal
oppositionofthe peaceprocess.In 1993,not long after the new presslaw delivered
increasedfreedomto the media,King Husseindissolvedparliamentand decreed

controversial amendmentsto the electoral law, disregardingdemandsthat changesto the
law passthroughparliament. Aimed at reducingthe opposition'spresencein parliament,
specificallythat of the Islamists,the law would have its desiredeffect when electionsthat
Novembersolidified the pro-regimemajority, deliveringa 50Voreductionin Islamist
deputies(Brand 1999;Lucas2005). This markedthe first major reversalof political
liberalization.
Examples of what has been called "deliberalization" becamemore frequent. The
following year witnessedrenewedpressrestrictions,the stifling of freedomof
expression,and the targeteddissolutionof predominantlyIslamistmunicipal courts,as
domestic opposition to the October 1994 peacewith Israel mounted. When riots broke
out in Kerak over bread prices in 1996,the regime respondedwith the termination of
parliament'ssessionand numeroushumanrights violations (Brand lggg). This trend of
reverting to deliberalization would characterizethe rest of King Hussein's rule. The
presslaw would be revisedin 1997and againin 1998to restrictpressfreedoms,and the
governmentwould ban demonstrationsof oppositionto its policy of distancingitself from
Iraq.
What explainsthis completereversalof policies? Why did the king choose
political liberalizationin responseto the 1989riots and the exactoppositeafter thosein
1996? Various explanationshavebeengiven, but nonecompletelyanswersthese
questions.While someattributethe shift to deliberalizationto Hussein's"dwindling
enthusiasmfor democraticactivity" (Robins 2004,188) or to recentmilitary welfare
growth (Baylouny 2008, 278), most commentatorsseemto concludethat the peace
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processwith Israelis to blame for derailingwhat appearedto be a promising
democratizationprocess(Brand 1999). Those who hold this view generally maintain that
Hussein was forced to offer liberalization as a quid pro quo for economic austerity in
1989but later reversedthe processto securea successfulpeacewith Israel. This account
explainsthe regime'smanipulationof the electorallaw in L993,to achievea parliament
capableof ratifying the coming peacetreaty. It also explains a number of authoritarian
measuresto suppressoppositionto the peace,suchas pressrestrictions,the dissolutionof
Islamist municipal courts, and the routine denial of permits for rallies and demonstrations
againstnormalizationwith Israel. Nevertheless,the idea that an unpopularpeacewith
Israelwas responsiblefor Jordan'sdeliberalizationin the 1990'sfails to standup to close
inspection.
First and most visibly, blaming the peacenegotiationsand treaty with Israel for
Jordan'sdeliberalizationfails to accountfor subsequentauthoritarianmeasuresenacted
after the treaty, many of which were unrelatedto the normalizationprocesswith Israel.
Why exactly was the regime's responseto the 1996 bread riots further deliberali zation.
the exact oppositecoursefrom that takenin 1989under similar conditions? Why did the
regime suppressoppositionto its policy regardingIraq in 1998and use force againstproIraq demonstrators?Thesedevelopmentscontribute to a generaltrend of deliberalization
that peacewith Israelcannotexplain. Second,a closeexaminationof the regime's own
liberalization policies revealsthe sameauthoritariantraits that emergedmore noticeably
as peacewith Israel approached.This undermineswhat has been seenas an about-faceof
democratizationin Jordandue to the peaceprocess.

ll

In the following chaptersI will presentJordan's apparentdemocratizationand its
subsequentreversalin the light of changingselectioninstitutions. This study exposes
both liberalization and deliberalizationpolicies as necessarysurvival strategiesfor the
regime in the wake of threatenedselectioninstitutions and also as efforts to manipulate
thosevery institutions. Glenn Robinson(1998) and RussellLucas (2005) have also
interpretedJordan's liberalization as a necessarysurvival strategy,but thesestudieslack
the framework of selectorate-inducedpolitical incentives, offered in the following
chapter'spresentationof the selectoratetheory (Buenode Mesquita,et al. 2003).
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL APPROACHES
Introduction
In the previous chapterI looked at the controversial and puzzlingpolicies of
Jordan'spolitical liberalizationand subsequentdeliberalization:Examining a central
theory of political selectioninstitutionsand their effect on leaders'policies allows a
betterunderstandingof the abovedevelopments.Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,Alastair
Smith, RandolphSiverson,and JamesMorrow (2003) havepioneeredan innovative
framework treating political incentives as products of fundamentalinstitutional
arrangements.Their selectoratetheory centerson the size and ratio of key political
institutionsand their effect on the productionof public and private goods.
There are, of course,alternativemethodsfor explaining the above developments
in Jordan--mostnotably, the work of transition theoristswithin democratizationliterature.
This study's analysisof the selectoratetheory will benefit from a comparativeperspective
incorporatingthesescholars'work. This chapterthus presentsan overview of the
selectoratetheory and the transition approachto democratizationas well as the
implicationsof both for Jordan.

The SelectorateTheory
The selectoratetheory restson the assumptionthat political leadersseekto gain
and hold office, and it focuseson groupsin societywho determinewhetherthey succeed
or fail. Every leaderanswersto awinning coalition or supportbasenecessaryto remain
in power. A leader'swinning coalition is drawn from a larger group of individuals,the
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selectorate. While all membersof the selectoratehave at least a supposedsay in
selectingand replacingpolicymakers,a leaderonly needsto satisfyhis winning coalition
to maintain office. In democraciesthis coalition is comprisedof voters who elect the
leader; in autocraciesit is "the set of people who control enoughother instrumentsof
power to keep the leaderin office" (Buenode Mesquita2003, g).
The size of the winning coalition affectsthe types of goodsthat leadersprovide.
While all leadersprovide a mixture of public and private goods,they tailor that mix
according to the size of their winning coalitions in an effort to satisfy their coalitions at
minimal cost. Sinceprivate goodsare only distributedto coalition membersand
"diminish in value to individual coalition membersas the size of the group expands"(g),
leaderstend to focus on providing public goods,benefitingall membersof the state,as
the coalition size increases.Thus large winning coalitions,suchas thosein many
democracies,encouragethe provision of public goods,while small coalitions,as are
found in most autocracies,encouragethe provision of private goodsdistributedonly
amongstthe winning coalition.
Bueno de Mesquitaet al. (2003,chs.4 and 5), consistentlylink large winning
coalitionsto what may be consideredgood governance.Largecoalition statesare
repeatedlyshown to favor the supplyingof public goodssuchas civil liberties,political
rights, transparency,education,healthcare,and peace. Governmentsdependenton a
small coalition are converselyshown to engagein increasedcorruptionand cronyism as a
meansof providing private goodsto influential elites. One clear and often repeated
conclusionis that, for small coalition leaderssuchas autocrats,"bad policy often is good
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politics"(19).
The selectoratetheory also emphasizesthe relationshipbetweenthe size of a
leader'swinning coalition,or W, and that of the selectorate,or S. Sincea winning
coalition is comprised of selectoratemembers,a large selectorateprovides leaderswith a
largepool from which to selecttheir coalition. Potentialchallengersto the currentleader
must persuademembersof the leader'scoalition to swapsidesin order to defeatthe
incumbent. Coalition membersdo not risk much by supporting a challengerin large
coalition systemswhere private goods can be insignificant and where they have a fair
chanceof endingup in the challenger'sown winning coalition shouldhe or she succeed.
Of coursethe oppositeis true in small coalition,large selectoratesystems.Defecting
coalition membersin such systemsrisk much in private goods,having no guaranteethey
will be chosenfor the challenger'swinning coalition from the large selectorateshouldhe
gain office. This risk of exclusionis representedin the ratio WiS. As Bueno de
Mesquitaet al. (2002,563) explain,"The smallerthat WS is, the greaterthe risk and cost
associatedwith defectingto a challengerand,therefore,the strongerthe loyalty to the
incumbent." This loyalty norm represented
by WS is centralto understandingthe
political incentivesshapedby the institutionsof winning coalition and selectorate.
Of courseall individualsin a systemhave institutionalpreferences.The
disenfranchised
not includedin the selectorateprefer a large coalition system;even
though they are excluded from that coalition, they standto benefit from the public goods
generatedfor it. Membersof the selectorateoutsideof the winning coalition also prefer
a
largecoalition. While sucha systemwould provide them with increasedpublic goodsas

15

well, it would also increasetheir chancesof admissionto the winning coalition. 6aders
shouldnaturallyprefer a small winning coalition and large selectorate,as found in many
rigged electionsystems.Theseconditionslead to a strongloyalty norm amongst
coalition members,limiting the amount leadersmust spendto satisfy them.
The preferencesof coalition membersare more complex. Dependingon the
current size of the coalition, members' welfare may increaseby either enlarging or
shrinkingW. Bueno de Mesquitaet al. (2003)representthe welfare of coalition members
as coalition size changesthrougha graphicalcurve resemblinga swooshor checkmark
with an x-axis of winning coalition size and a y-axis of coalition members'welfare. If
the size of the winning coalition is alreadysufficiently small, members'welfare is best
increasedby shrinking W. The private goods alreadyproduced and distributed amongst
a
small coalition with a strongloyalty norm will be sharedby fewer peopleas the size of
the winning coalition getseven smaller. On the other hand,increasingthe size of the
winning coalition weakensthe loyalty norm, encouragingincumbentsto spendmore to
prevent coalition membersfrom defecting. And if the coalition is sufficiently large,
a
shift to the provision of public goods would better benefit membersthan thinly spread
private goods. The authorsconcludethat "the welfare of membersof the coalition
declines as the coalition gets bigger up to someturning point, after which further
increasesin coalition size lead to improvementin the members'welfare,'(334-335).
Thus the institutional preferencesof membersof the winning coalition are likely
to
dependon the currentsize of the coalition.
These are the core ideas comprising the selectoratetheory. They have been
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appliedto issuesas varied as political survival,taxation,successfuleconomic
development,and the democraticpeacephenomenon. The theory has not, however, been
widely usedto addressspecificpolicy decisions.This is primarily due to crudeindicators
of winning coalition and selectoratesize that, while permitting the testing of general
cross-nationaltrends predicted by the theory, are not fit to explain individual policy
shifts. By focusingon specificcasestudieswithin Jordan,this studyprovidesa more
preciseexaminationof selectioninstitutions,thus allowing a novel applicationof the
selectoratetheorv.

Alt ernative Appr oaches
The transition school within the democratrzationliteraturepresentsa capable
alternative approachto political liberalization in Jordan. Transition theorists generally
view political openingsas resultsof the actionsof individuals--usuallypoliticat elites-and focus on the transition from authoritarianto democraticrule (Potter et al. 1997). This
schoolof democratizationfinds its origin with Dankwart Rustow (1970),who devised
four phasesof the transitionto democracy:a backgroundcondition of nationalunity, a
preparatoryphasemarkedby political struggle,a decisionphasein which leaders
"institutionalizesomecrucial aspectof democraticprocedure,,(355), and a final
habituationphasewhere democracyis consolidated.Othershave sinceproposedsimilar
trajectoriesfor liberalizing states(Kaufman 19g6;przeworski 1991).
Severaltrends emergefrom theseworks. First, there is widespreadrecognition
that statesmay not graduatefrom all of the requisite stageslaid out by transition
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theorists;in other wotds, liberalizationmay not lead to consolidateddemocracy.
Liberalizationis thus aptly definedby Guillermo O'Donnell (1982, 235) as consistingof
"measureswhich, althoughinvolving a significantopeningof the previousbureaucraticauthoritarianregime (such as the effective judicial guaranteesof certain individual rights
or the implementation of parliamentaryforms not basedon free electoral competition),
remain short of what we could call a political democracy." This recognitionpavesthe
way for a secondcommon featureof transitiontheorists'work: an emphasison
authoritarianstatesinitiating liberalization with no intention of full democratization.
Adam Przeworski(1991) is not alonein approachingliberalizationin authoritarianstates
as a "controlled opening" usually designedto easesocialtension,not to usherin
democracy.
One final note concerningthe transition approachis in order. It is worth
consideringthe relative merits of the school'sefforts to pinpoint regimetype with those
of the selectoratetheory. While the selectoratetheory presentsa continuumfor analyzing
statesaccording to selectioninstitution iurangements,transition theorists are typically
limited to classifying statesaccordingto broad denominationssuch as totalitarian.
authoritarian,and democratic. This is not to say that they are unconcernedwith
distinguishingamongstatesof varying regime types--Linzand Stepen(1996) actually
take greatpains to createa typology of states(post-totalitarian,authoritarian,sultanistic,
etc.) capableof sheddinglight on how a state'sprior regime type affectsits transitionto
democracy--butmerely that the selectoratetheory allows for greaterprecision in
analyzing the make-up of states(and how that affects policies such as liberalization).
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The Theoriesand Jordan
How do thesetheoretical frameworks apply to Jordan? While the following
chapterswill investigatetheir applicability during the relevant periods of liberalization
and deliberalization by identifying the winning coalition and selectoratein the kingdom
and examiningthe detailsof Jordan'sabortiveliberal transition,someobservations
immediatelystandout. In 1988,just beforeliberalization,the kingdom was clearly an
authoritarian,small coalition system. The POLITY IV datacollection (Marshall and
Jaggers2OO7),which includesmeasurements
of states'degreesof democracyand
autocracyfor every country year,assignsa polity scoreof-9 to Jordanin 1988on a scale
from +10 (stronglydemocratic)to -10 (stronglyautocratic).Furthermore,Jordan
exemplifieda numberof characteristicsassociatedwith small winning coalitionssuchas
"widespread corruption at all levels of the government" (Shlaim 2007, 474). The
kingdom's financeswere "notoriouslyuntransparent,"which enabledskimming on
contracts(Robins 2004, 168). Poor governancein the form of abundantprivate goods to
supporterswas nothing new. Subsidiesto importantsouthernconstituencies"had long
beenstaplesof Hashemitepatronage"(Robinson1998,391) as well as cashallowancesto
pro-regimetribal leaders(Baylouny2008, 288).
The following chapterwill provide further exploration into the size and
compositionof the winning coalition and selectoratein Jordanbefore,during, and after
political liberalizationand deliberalization.This will allow a betterunderstandingof the
political incentivesbehind the policy shifts in Jordanselectedaboveas well as their
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effects. This study will of coursecontinueto benefit from a comparativeperspective
incorporating the transition approachto democratization,specifically in the attemprro
make senseof the policies in questionin chapterfour.
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CHAPTER THREE: MEASURING INSTITUTIONS IN JORDAN
Jordan as a Rentier State
Any effort to identify fundamentalinstitutional arrangementsin Jordan from the
1980sand onward shouldbegin with the conceptof Arab rentierism. A considerable
body of literature(Luciani 1990;Beblawi 1990;Anderson 1987)distinguishescertain
developing economiesoften found in the Middle East from others for their dependence
on external rents rather than domestic taxation. Rather than extract resourcesfrom their
domestic economies,theserentier statestend to rely on external sourcesof revenue.
Numerousmajor petroleumexporters,for example,function as rentier statesby
dependingalmost entirely on oil revenueinsteadof the productivity of their labor forces.
Becauseexternal rents permit rentier statesto essentiallyprovide servicesfor free to
domesticpopulations,"neo-patrimonialnetworks" and patron-clientrelationsbetween
the governmentand domesticactorsaboundin suchsystems.Rex Brynen (1992,74)
explainsthe existenceof a rentier socialcontract,as domesticpopulationsacceptpolitical
quiescencein exchangefor statebenefitsand "political legitimacyis, in a very real sense,
'purchased'
througheconomicrewards."
Not a petroleumexporter,Jordanis considere
d.a semi-rentier(Brynen 1992,72)
ot anon-oil rentier (Baylouny 2008, 284) for its longtime dependenceon foreign aid and
workers' remittances,which while technicallynot "rents," function similarly enoughto
permit their inclusion. Initially reliant upon Western aid, foreign grants averaged30
percentof governmentrevenuefrom 1952to 1966. With increasinglevels of Arab aid
following the 1967Arab-Israeliwar, though,foreign assistancewould provide over 55
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percentof revenuefrom 1967to 1980(Brynen 1992,78-79). Additionally, the regional
oil boom allowed an increasingnumberof Jordanians,generallyof Palestiniandescent,to
work abroadin the Gulf. Philip Robins (2004,143) estimatesone-thirdof the Jordanian
workforce was working abroadby the end of the 1970's,supportingthe kingdom with
workers' remittances. Theseexternal sourcesof revenueenabledJordan to provide for
segmentsof its populationwithout excessivedomestictaxation,conducingstate-social
relationstypical of rentierism. As Brynen explains,"Stateexpendituresallowed the state
(in general) and the King (in particular) to distribute significant political and economic
rewardsto loyal--or at leastquiescent--constituenc
ies" (1992,79).
Theseloyal--or at leastquiescent--recipients
of regimepatronagetendedto be of
Jordanian,or EastBank, origin (as opposedto Palestinian).Rural, Jordanian-populated
regions in the south received a clearly disproportionateamount of statespendingon the
provision of servicesand works projects(Brynen 1992, g2;Baylouny 200g, 2gg).
Preferentialtreatmentfor EastBankers,though,was most visible in stateemployment,
especiallyfollowing the Jordanian-Palestinian
clashesof the early !970's. While not
high-paying,public employmentdid provide a stableincome and securehealthcare and
educationalbenefits. Jordaniansso dominatedstatepositionsin the military and bloated
bureaucracythat commentatorsfrequently refer to the "Jordanization" of the state
(Baylouny 2008, 288-289). Theseexamplesof Hashemitepatronageto a significant
segmentof the populationare consistentwith rentierism,sinceJordanianexpropriation
through taxation "paled in comparisonto statedistribution through employment and
social welfare programmes,enhancingregime legitimacy and undercutting
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representational
demands"(Brynen 1992,83). Theserentier arrangementswould soonbe
disruptedby the economiccrisis and subsequentlMF-mandatedausteritymeasures,
threateninglong-establishedselectioninstitutionsin Jordan.

SelectionInstitutions in Jordan
Becausethe winning coalition and selectorateare dependentupon the state's
current leader, a thorough graspof selectioninstitutions first requiresclarity regarding
decisionmaking and agendasetting. Despitethe appearance
of the monarch'sseparation
from day-to-day politics in Jordan,King Hussein effectively functioned as the principal
policymakerin Jordan. As king he did not publicly servein the government,but it is
clear Hussein,like any Hashemitemonarch,set "major policy decisionsand trajectories"
(Lucas2005,21). Ratherthan the architectsof their own policies,Hussein'sprime
ministersrepeatedlyfound themselvesservingas dispensable"shock absorbers"or
"safeguards"for thoseof the king (Rath 1994,542). As Avi Shlaim (2001,75) explains,
"Dumping a prime minister was a way of dissociatingthe king from a policy that had
becomeunpopularand of appeasingthe public.',
RussellLucas (2005, 20-22)identifiesfive pillars of King Hussein'sregime
coalition in the yearsleadingup to 1989'sshift toward.liberalization:EastBank tribes.
ethnic and religious minorities, the statebureaucracy,the military, and palestinian elites
long-established
in the Jordanianprivate sector. Selectedby Lucas for their supportfor
the monarch,thesefive groupsare not synonymouswith Hussein'swinning coalition as
definedby the selectoratetheory--theywere not all necessaryfor his political survival
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and did not all receiveprivate goods. Nevertheless,thesegroups--especially
the East
Bank tribes--didsupply most of the pro-regimeelitescloseto King Husseinand
necessaryfor his legitimacy.
Such eliteseffectively functionedas the king's winning coalition and enjoyed
private goods from the regime such as influential governmentpositions and material
benefits(Robinson1998;Baylouny2008). As Abla Amawi (rggz,27) pointsout, .,Top
positionsalwayswent to the sameold faces,families, and clans." And, as mentioned
previously, paymentswere commonly distributed to important tribal leaders. Brynen
(1992,80) describesthe relationshipbetweencoalition shaykhsand the crown as a "neopatrimonialextensionof the traditionalpracticeof subsidizingallied tribal elites,"
arguingthat it "servedto reinforcethe basesof a shaykh'ssocialpower at home whilst
renderinghim increasinglydependenton stateresources.,'
The "Jordanization"of stateemploymentnotedabovecan alsobe viewed as a
private good to coalition members. Like material benefits paid to tribal shaykhs,the
regime'srestrictionof stablepublic employmentto EastBankershelpedcoalition elites
ensurethe welfare of their constituencies.This is especiallytrue in southernEastBank
communitieswherejobs were scarce.While a reward to coalition members,though,
preferential treatmentfor East Bankers also constituteda direct benefit to what could be
consideredJordan'sselectorate--the
group from which the winning coalition is drawn.
Interviewswith Jordanianofficials and scholarsconfirm theseinstitutional
arrangements.Yaser Adwan, professorat German-JordanianUniversity and former
directorof social securityin Jordan,identifiesthe EastBank tribes and militarv as Kins
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Hussein'snecessarysupportbaseleadingup to 1989(March 3, 2009). Sincethe officer
corps in the Jordanianarmed forces "have always been dominatedby East Bankers"
(Robinson1998,410),this accountseemsconsistentwith identifying Hussein'scoalition
as influential elites generallyof EastBank descent.Amin Mashagbeh,professorof
political scienceat Middle EastUniversity and former Jordanianminister of social
development,agreesthat the tribal and army leadersconstitutedHussein'snecessary
supportbaseand that theseelitesreceivedprivate benefitssuchas "land, cars,health
care,education,and money" (April 15, 2009).
The national parliamentaryelections and shift toward political liberalization
beginningin 1989significantlyalteredtheseinstitutionalarrangements,
primarily
througha changein the perceptionof Jordanianpolicymaking. As noted above,the king
functioned as the ultimate policymaker despitehis separationfrom Jordanianpolitics.
The 1989electionsand broadermove toward political liberalization,though,suggested
that this arrangementhad changedby giving the impressionthat any voter could help
determinepolicymakersin Jordan,thus ostensiblyincreasingboth the winning coalition
and the selectorate.
The selectorate,or group of peoplewith a supposedsay in determiningleaders,
clearly grew. With the new, liberal perceptionof policymakingin Jordan,any nineteenyear-old citizen outside of the military and security forces had a nominal role in electing
and replacingthe decisionmakersin Jordan. As Bueno de Mesquitaet al. (2003,336-j)
point out, "Universal suffrageis a way of signalingthat almostanyonecould, with a very
low probability, make it into a winning coalition." As such,the electionsin Jordanwere
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a signalof a newly enlargedand representedselectorate.
The winning coalition in Jordan,however,did not mimic the selectorate'sgrowth.
Despitea changein the perceptionof policymaking,the king remainedin control.
Mashagbehnotesthat even during the perceiveddemocratrzation,"theking's power
stayedthe same"(April 15, 2009). He retainedhis powersto appointnew prime
ministersand governmentsand to dissolveparliament. Regardlessof the kingdom,s
apparentshift toward democracy,Jordanianvoters could never replacethe ultimate
policymaker--themonarch. Thus, Hussein'swinning coalition remainedfairly constant
despitepolitical liberalization. As Glenn Robinson(1998,405) observes,,.themosr
powerful groupsin Jordanprior to 1989remain so today:the monarchyand its coterie,
the army and securityservices,wealthy businesselites,and EastBank tribal leaders."
Theseshifting selectioninstitutionsare crucial to a full understandingof Jordan's
political liberalizationand deliberalization.The next chapterwill addresshow they
shapedincentivesbehind thesepolicies,the policiesthemselves,and their effectson
Jordanianpolitics as a whole.
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CHAPTER FOUR: EXPLAINING POLICY
Liberalization As a Survival Strategy
Theseinstitutional arangements permit a clearer understandingof the policies
detailedin chapterone,beginningwith the contextof crisis in which they were formed.
It is both clear and logical that the April 1989riots following the IMF austerity measures
and promptingpolitical liberalizationcenteredaroundJordan'sselectorate.Beginning in
pro-Hashemitetowns in the south,the uprisings expresseda plain frustration on the part
of East Bank tribal selectoratemembers. Such frustration is understandable,given the
recentbreakdownin Jordan'srentier affangements.With decliningopportunitiesfor
secure,public employment and a number of steepprice rises throughout the kingdom,
East Bankers long dependenton preferential treatmentthrough economic security and
"Jotdanization" now found their welfare compromised. As Anne Marie Baylouny (2008,
281) explains,"What was initially a reward [was] fast becominga curseunder the new
economicarrangements."
With this breakdownin Jordan'ssemi-rentiersocialcontracttrading political
rights for economicsecurity,it is not surprisingthat rioters alsobeganto voice political
frustrations. East Bankers demandedrepresentationand condemnedwidespread
corruption(Robins 2004,170; Rath 1994,s35). Suchresponsesare congruentwith
Jordan'sdecentlysizedselectorateand small winning coalition. Dissatisfiedselectorate
membersstoodlittle chanceto enterHussein'scoalition and enjoy private goodsfrom the
regime. EducatedJordanians"resentedthe fact that they could not hope to break into the
ruling elite on their own merits" (Amawi 1992.27\.
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It was particularly significant that the selectoraterose againstthe regime, as
opposedto the disenfranchised
Palestiniansas was perhapsexpected(Baylouny 2008,
28I). They were the historicallypro-Hashemiteconstituentsof coalition elites. While
actual revolt againstthe throne was not an issue at the time, the mere possibility of a
joining forceswith marginalizedgroupssuchas palestinians,
frustratedselectorate
leftists,and Arab-nationalistsposeda clear threatto the monarch. An even larger
looming threatwas coalition discontentat dwindling private goodssuchas "development
funds, subsidiesand other economic resourcesfrom the state,'(Brynen lggz, gg).
Kathrine Rath (1994) summarizesthe three options available to the king in
addressingthesethreats:reversalof unpopular economic reform, forceful implementation
of the austerityprogram,or political compromise. An abolishmentof the austerity
measureswould have "merely postponedthe momentwhen the crisis had to be dealt
with" (542)' Doggedimplementationof the program,however,would have involved
increasedauthoritarianism,further alienating an increasingly dissatisfiedselectorateand
leaving the threatof discontentedcoalition membersunresolved.Instead,Hussein
decidedon a compromise,offering political liberalization in exchanqefor economic
austerity.
It is importantto note the ironic natureof this compromise. As previouslynoted,
the king's initiation of political liberalizationgrew the kingdom's selectorateat a faster
rate than the winning coalition. In terms of the selectoratetheory, WS actually
decreased,thus strengtheningthe loyalty norm amongstcoalition membersno longer
assuredof their selectionfrom an expandedselectorate.Long-time elites ,.felt
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threatened"(Milton-Edwards 1993, I94), realizing "that their past links with the regime
may not assuretheir future political survival" (Amawi 1992,29). This is best seenin the
East Bank elites' parliamentaryfight for survival, specifically after a strong showing by
the Islamist oppositionin the 1989elections. The "ConstitutionalBloc" in parliament
was comprisedof coalition membersnow "threatenedby politicalhberalization" (Brand
1999,56) and eagerto retain positionsof influence. Thus throughmanipulatingpolitical
institutions,the king managedto reducethe threatof a discontentedwinning coalition
and the demandfor greaterprivate goodsby strengtheningthe loyalty norm and, by
extension,his coalition's dependence
on the throne. Meanwhile,the prospectsof
political reform and free electionspacified the politically-frustrated selectoratemembers
mentionedabove.
This manipulationof institutionsis consistentwith the behaviorof leaders
expectedby the selectoratetheory. Sinceincreasesin the selectoratesize "decreasethe
chancethat the leaderwill be removed" (Buenode Mesquitaet al. 2003,288),leaders
tend to strengthenthe loyalty norm by lowering WS when given the opportunity (400402). The 1989crisis in JordanprovidedKing Husseinwith just suchan opportunity.
Somescholars(Robinson1998;Lucas2005; Milton-Edwards 1993;
Wicktorowicz 1999)have similarly concludedthat Jordan'sdemocratizationservedthe
interestsof the regimeby maintainingthe statusquo. Glenn Robinson(1998) describesit
as a "top-down processdesignedto maintainbasicpower relationsin Jordan,not to
significantlychangethem" (391). euintan wicktorowicz (1999) likewise sees
llberalization as a "tactical" strategynot guided by democraticprinciples. While not
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addressingthe regime's manipulationof selectioninstitutions,thesestudiesdo recognize
that power was "left in the handsof the monarchy" (Milton-Edwards 1993, r94) by
examiningthe heavy,and sometimeshidden,regulationof eachact of political
liberalization. The following sectionsdetail suchcarefulregimeregulationof eachstep
toward Jordan'smuch hailed democratization.

First Steps:Elections and the National Charter
Given the implicationsof the selectoratetheory for Jordan'sliberalizationas no
more than a necessarysurvival strategy,a more detailed look at the stepsof liberalization
is warranted. A closeexaminationof the kingdom's 1989electionsand its progressive
National Charterrevealssignificant,though subtle,regulationsthat seemdecidedlyless
than liberal.
It is important to note certain shortcomingsof the kingdom's "generally free and
fair" (Robins 2004, l7I) 1989electionsconcerningmalapportionment. The uneven
distribution of parliamentary seatsand constituenciesin Jordandatesback to the original
1928electorallaw, grantingoveffepresentation
to pro-regimeminorities and establishing
electoral constituenciesaccordingto geographicaldistricts rather than population
distribution. As RussellLucas (2005,28) explains,"Rural overrepresentation
generally
hashelpedtraditionalregime allies in gaining seatsin the Parliament." The 1989
elections,functioningunder the recentlyamended1986electorallaw, clearly continued
this intentional malapportionment. The southern,pro-Hashemitetown of Kerak and
Palestinian-dominated
East Amman provide a palpableillustration of the skewed
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distributionof seats. Kerak enjoyednine parliamentaryseatsin 1989,four more than its
population would merit under a proportional distribution; EasternAmman, on the other
hand,was grantedthree seats,sevenlessthan its large populationwould hypothetically
warrant(Lucas 2005,29). Suchtargetedrepresentational
benefitstoward pro-regime
constituenciestaint Jordan'sliberalizationfrom the outset,calling into questionthe
throne'sintentionsin proposinga political opening.
There are,likewise, certainsubtletiesto be graspedconcerningthe National
Charter designedto chart Jordan's liberal way forward. First, we should note the purpose
of the charter. While the documentdid guaranteea new, pluralist Jordan,it also affirmed
Hussein'slegitimacyby requiring acceptanceof the Hashemitemonarchy(Brand 1999;
Lucas 2005). Philip Robins (2004, I74) appropriatelyseesit as a "reflection of the
renewedinsecuritiesfelt by the throne." A perhapsequally significantobservation
concerning the charter lies in the skewedcomposition of the "Royal Committee for
Drafting the National Charter." While touted for covering the full spectrumof political
opinion in the kingdom, the distributioneasilylisted in the directionof members
supportingthe regime. As Lucas (2005,33) illustrates,the 80 membercommittee
contained"l6 conseryatives,15 liberals,8 independents,
8 Islamists,8 Arab nationalists,
and 5 leftists." Such a compositionenabledthe committeeto draft a documentcalline for
a guardedand controlledliberalizationin alignmentwith the regime'sinterests.
It is worth noting that theseless-than-liberalshortcomingsof the 1989elections
and National Charterdid more to help Husseinthan assistinghim to control
liberalization. They allowed him to grant influential positionsto regime supporters--the
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electionsthrough overrepresentationof supportive districts and the charter through the
compositionof the drafting committee. Suchpositionsof prestigeand influenceactedas
private goodsdoled out to supporters.Thus, evenin the midst of a perceived
democratizationprocess,Jordancontinuedto function as a small-coalitionstateaccordins
to the selectoratetheorv.

The Political Parties and PressLaws
The abovestepsof liberalizationwould soonbe followed by others,suchas the
inclusion of oppositionmembersin Prime Minister Badran'scabinetand the deference
shownby Husseinto Jordanianpublic opinion during the Gulf Crisis. It is perhaps
significant,though,that Badran'soppositioncabinetmembersfound themselvesas
ministers of justice, labor, health, social affairs, and statefor governmentaffairs. Laurie
Brand (1999,54) explainsthat while theseare importantposts,"the key portfolios of
foreign affairs, the interior, finance, and energy and mineral resourcesremained
unchangedfrom the previousgovernment." As for Hussein'sresponseto the Gulf Crisis,
it shouldbe notedthat while he certainlystoodwith his peoplein opposingthe U.S.-led
coalition, the king can hardly be said to have sidedwith kaq. Instead,the king carefully
navigatedhis statethroughthe crisis to protectthe imageof the kingdom's nascent
liberalization. As KathrineRath (1994,551) notes,a pro-Westernposition during the
Gulf Crisis "could seriouslyhavechallengedthe processof democratization.,,It seems
likely that a blatantdisregardfor the Jordanianpublic's widespreadenthusiasmin support
of kaq would havecausedmany to questionthe natureand extentof the kinsdom's new
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political opening. Instead,Husseinopposedthe U.S.-ledcoalition while carefully
distancinghimself from SaddamHusseinwith ambiguouslanguagedenyingterritory
obtainedby force. The king's careful,equivocalnavigationthroughthe crisis functioned
similarly to the inclusion of oppositionmembersin less-than-crucial
cornersof Badran,s
cabinet. Both furthered the perceptionof ongoing democratizationwithout committing
the stateto a genuinetransition.
Each of the abovestepshelpedto pave the way for two subsequentlegislative
accomplishments
marking the apogeeof Jordan'sliberalization-- the 1992political
PartiesLaw and 1993Pressand PublicationsLaw. Both following from the National
Charter,theselaws promisedsignificantreform given the nationalban on political parties
since 1957and the activepresslaw still in effect sincemartial law in 1973. This
promised reform was realized to a certain extent as political parties were legalized and
increasedfreedomsgrantedto the press. As with the precedingexamplesof Jordan's
political opening,though,the laws warrantcloserinspection.
It is first appropriateto examine regime motives behind the governmentdraft law
Iegalizing political parties which managedto survive parliamentarydebatereasonably
well. Severalscholars(Milton-Edwards1993;Robinson 1998)have suggestedthar
regime support for party legalization was an attempt by the throne to weaken the Islamist
oppositionwhich had fared surprisinglywell in the 1989elections. The Muslim
Brotherhood had proved remarkably effective in mobilizing voter support for the social
organization'scandidates,and legalizationof political partiesmight provide pro-regime
party competition for the brotherhoodin subsequentelections. Furthermore,party
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regulationswithin the law proscribedoutsidefinancial and organizationalties. The law
would thus provide legaljustification for possiblefuture regime actionsagainstthe
Islamic Action Front, the Muslim Brotherhood'spolitical wing, as well as palestinianoriented parties should they overly prosperunder the new liberal arrangements(Robinson
1998,395).
Like the Political PartiesLaw, the 1993Pressand PublicationsLaw "helped
institutionalizepolitical liberalizationin the kingdom" while simultaneouslymarking its
limits (Lucas 2005,67). While the law concededgreaterfreedomsto the press,it also
demarcatednumerous"red lines" not to be crossed.Suchrestrictionsincluded:news
offensive to the king or royal family, unsanctionednews of the armed forces, content
contemptuousto religion, articlesdamagingnationalunity, news shakingconfidencein
the national currency, content contrary to public morals, and advertisementsfor
unapprovedmedicines (63-64). The law thus effectively insulated the regime from press
criticism while advancingthe perceptionof democratization.
Thesedevelopmentsmarkedthe height of Jordan'sliberalization,but they reveal
the sameauthoritariantendenciesthat would soon emergemore visibly through
deliberalization. Each of the aboveexamplesof liberalization furthered the perception of
political opening. They suggesteda shift from Jordan'sauthoritarianpastto a future at
leastpartly determinedby the kingdom's citizens. As we have seen,though,each
developmentwas carefully regulatedto prevent the realizationof a true democratic
opening' These are the stepsthe regime took to achievea larger selectoratewhile
retainingits small -- thoughmore loyal -- winning coalition.
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Deliberalization
As describedin chapterone, a comprehensivedeliberalization soon followed
Jordan'sliberal dabblings. The first instanceof this was the regime's controversial 1993
amendmentsto the electorallaw benefitingits supporters-- "especiallythosewith tribal
support" (Lucas 2005,72). Enactedthrough a provisional law after the king had
dissolvedparliament,the amendmentssetup a one-person,one-votesystemthat would
succeedin devastatingthe Islamist parliamentarypresenceby preventing the affiliationvoting that enabledthe successof Muslim Brotherhoodcandidatesin 1989. Instancesof
deliberalizationincreasedas oppositionmountedagainstnormalizationwith Israel.
Examplesinclude renewedpressrestrictions,the stifling of freedomof expression,and
the targeteddissolution of predominantly Islamist municipal courts. The regime
respondedwith the terminationof parliament'ssessionand numeroushumanrights
violations to 1996bread-priceriots in Kerak (Brand 1999). This trend of reverting to
deliberalization would characterizethe rest of King Hussein's rule with further revisions
to the presslaw in 1997and 1998as well as a 1998ban on demonstrationsof opposition
to the regime'spolicy of distancingitself from lraq.
This deliberalizationis logical if we considerJordan'sinstitutionalarrangements.
It is important to rememberthat, despiteits faux democratization,the kingdom remained
a small-coalitionstate. It is not surprising,then,that Jordanshouldeventuallyexhibit
common traits of sucha system. Bueno de Mesquitaet al. (2003, 190-192)report a
strongcorrelationbetweencoalition size and the protectionof civil libertiesand political
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rights. Further liberalization would certainly have testedregime control over the process.
As Glenn Robinson(1998,404) argues,Jordan'slimited democratizationcould not "be
deepenedwithout threateningestablishedelite interests." It is also clear that the urgency
of 1989,which promptedpoliciesthat annealedthe loyalty norm amongstHussein's
coalition, had passed.The regimehad survivedthe crisis and was no longer confinedto
feigning a largercoalition. While electionswould continueto suggesta larger selectorate
and more democraticpolicymaking in Jordan,it is natural that the regime should return to
acting completelyaccordingto its interestsas determinedby a small winning coalition.

The Transition Approach
Transition theorieswithin the democratizationliteratureare likewise capableof
explainingJordan'scontrolledand eventuallyreversedliberalization,and this study
would benefit from examining such an approach.
It is clear that the prospectof Jordan'sstrategicdabblingin liberalizationis not
unfamiliar to transitiontheorists. DankwartRustow (1970) acknowledgesthat decision
makers may engagein liberalization, representedhereby his "decision" phaseof
democratization,as a meansto an end. Alfred Stepan(1986, 75-16)likewise admitsthe
existenceof regimes with "reasonto keep the liberali zationprocessjust short of
democratization,"identifying Brazil in 1981-1982as apolity under suchcontrolled
liberalization. Adam Przeworski(I99I,57) actuallypresentsall liberalizationprojects
launchedby authoritarianpowers as "invariably intended as controlled openingsof
political space,"not designedto lead to consolidateddemocracy.Theseaccountsbased

36

on the observationof other statesinitiating liberalization as a survival strategyare clearly
relevantfor Jordanin the early 1990's.
Transition accountsof democratizationalso presenta fitting framework for
addressingJordan'sdeliberalization.Stepan(1986, 72) identifiesthe possibility of a
reversal of regime-led liberalization if "the costs of toleration are much greaterthan the
costsof repression."Kaufman (1986, 92) andPrzeworski(1991, 62) eachpresenta game
outlining the stagesof democratictransitionwith the final stageinvolving a decision
madeby elites to extendor roll back liberalization. Sincethesemodels' division of
authoritarian-blocdecision makersinto liberalizers and hardliners is not entirely
applicable to the Jordanianmonarchy, a similar gamemay be constructedusing the same
transitionistlogic (Figure4.1). In this model the authoritarianregime first facesthe
choiceof whetherto open politically. If it doesnot, the resultis the statusquo
authoritariansystem(SAUT). If it does,civil societythen facesthe choice of whetherto
seekautonomousmobilizationor not. If it doesnot, the result is a broadened
authoritariansystem(BAUT); if it does,the regime then eitherrepressesthis
mobilization,attachingthe probability r to successfulrepressionleadingto a narrower
system(NAUT), or continuesto reform, leading to genuinedemocratictransition.
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Given the contextof crisis in which Jordaninitiatedliberalization,the regime
clearly preferreda changeguaranteeingsurvival to the statusquo. AssumeHussein
preferredNAUT > BAUT > SAUT > TRANSITION > INSURRECTION. The model,
then, illustratesthe regime's decisionto open,preferringboth BAUT and NAUT to
SAUT. While the initial probability attachedby Husseinto successfulfuture repression
(r) is not immediatelyclear,it is clear that openingprovidedan escape(if only
temporary) from the uncertain survival prospectsof SAUT.
As for civil society within Jordan,it is enoughfor us to recognizethe preference
of TRANSITION > BAUT. It should,of course,be notedthat this is a gameof
incomplete information. The previously mentioned shift in the perceptionof
policymaking surely distortedforesightconcerninga regimeresponseto mobilization.
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An outcomeof NAUT, then, seemeda lessthan likely responseto civil society
mobilization in the ostensibly democratizingstate. Jordaniansociety thus took advantage
of the political openingas oppositionforcesnearly won the majority in the 1989elections
despiteintentionalmalapportionmentand as Jordaniannewspapers,especiallythe weekly
editions,pressedthe limits of increasedpressfreedoms. As civil societymobilization
beganto culminatein oppositionto the peaceprocesswith Israel,the regime responded.
Perhapsby trusting the top-rate security forces in Jordan,the regime attacheda
probability of successfulrepressionhigh enoughto seekNAUT over genuinereform.
This gamethus illustratesa potentialtransitionapproachto explainingJordan'spolitical
liberalizationand deliberalization.
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CONCLUSION
This study hasfound the selectoratetheory capableofaddressingJordan's
abortivepolitical liberalization,matchingand even exceedinga transitionapproachin
explanatorypower. Like the transition approachto democratization,the selectorate
theory accountsfor the kingdom's controlled liberalization as a state survival strategy
neverintendedto lead to full democratization.The selectorateaccount,however,
continuesby sheddinglight on the ironic strengtheningof the king's position as
liberalizationprogressed.Only by examiningJordan'smanipulatedinstitutional
arrangementsand seeinghow liberalization actually resultedin a smaller WS ratio can
we understandthe strengtheningof the loyalty norm amongstcoalition members. Thus
while both approachespresentthe kingdom's liberalization as a regime strategyto satisfy
discontentedconstituencies,only the selectoratetheory illustrateshow the process
actuallyincreasedcoalition members'dependencyon the king, shieldingHusseinfrom
the discontentof thosewho matteredmost for his political survival -- his winning
coalition.
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